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Abstract:
Canon Law has not been valid law in the Nordic countries since the 16 th Century
Reformation, and ecclesiastical law has been understood as a branch of public administrative law. The legal regulation of freedom of religion or belief has not basically changed this
However, recent changes in religious establishment law combined with changes in theoretical approaches to what is covered by freedom of religion and belief might introduce such changes. What is at stake is the concept of law, and not only parallel legal orders, but also legal pluralism: is the inclusion of religious legal systems such as Canon Law and Shari'a through a widened recognition of 'religious autonomy' really the best way forward, or should some connections between these religious laws and the law of the land be upheld? This article suggests the latter approach through the recognition of long-standing and basic concepts such as the division of powers and overlapping legal norms.
I. 500 YEARS OF REJECTION OF RELIGIOUS LAW AS VALID LAW IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 1
A common characteristic for the five Nordic countries -Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland -is that the vast majority of their populations are Lutheran, being members of majority churches with special links to the national states. Currently, in 2015, the Lutheran churches still have more than 65% of their respective populations as members. 2 It could even be argued that for some of these countries, Lutheranism has contributed to the development or upkeep of local languages, due to the idea of translating the Bible and organizing the church services in the national language. This applies not only to spoken, but also to written languages in use for peasants and state institutions alike. Thus, the humanist dimensions of
Lutheranism have contributed to state building in some of the countries.
A. Historical Rejection of Canon Law as Parallel Legal System in the North
In all the Nordic countries, the Lutheran reformation contributed to state building in a central way by its unanimous rejection of Canon Law. The Danish reformation took place in 1536.
Since Norway and Iceland (as well as the Faroe Islands and Greenland) were under the rule of the Danish king, the Reformation also -against the protest of local noblemen and bishopsincluded those countries. The rejection of Canon Law very soon became an integral dimension of the Reformation: already in 1537 the new church order was given by the King.
In these West Nordic countries, under the rule of Denmark, absolutism was introduced in 1660, including rule over the church, as evident under the Danish Law of 1683 and the Norwegian law of 1685. With the adoption of these laws, no separate church existed anymore, only the King's obligation to guide and maintain all his citizens in a clear and right understanding of religion (that is: Lutheran Christianity), providing priests in all parts of the kingdom in order to preach and teach. Freedom of religion was admitted to foreigners, who 2 Church of Sweden 65%; The Finnish Evangelical-Lutheran Church 73%; The Norwegian Church 77%; The Danish Folkekirke 78%; The Icelandic Church 79%.
could settle in the Kingdom if allowed by the King, but no citizens of the Kingdom were allowed to change their religion. The pietist movements in Halle and Herrnhut also influenced the state-church, as seen, for example, in the introduction of confirmation as an obligation on all citizens in 1536.
The reformation also led to a break with Canon Law in the East Nordic countries, Sweden and
Finland. This break, however, was not as clear with regards to the internal church hierarchy as such. In the East Nordic countries, Canon Law was dissolved as early as 1536, but by a church meeting and not by the King alone. A new church meeting in 1572 decided on a Lutheran church order, but this was challenged by the then Catholic (Polish) kings ruling in
Sweden. In 1593 a group of noblemen called for the Church to extend the Protestant church order and rituals to the royal family. The Swedish Queen Christina, who converted to Catholicism, tried in the first half of the 17 th century to organize another counter reformation;
she failed and had to leave the country. The end result was that even though Canon Law was dissolved also in the East Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland kept the idea of the Church as one, identifiable structure, internally organized under an archbishop and with chapters making internal administrative decisions, whereas the very idea of a Church as something different from the state structures disappeared in the West Nordic countries.
B. Nordic Monolithic Understanding of Law
In combination with the introduction of absolutism, the fact that the validity of Canon Law was discontinued in the Nordic countries paved the way for a monolithic understanding of law in these countries. The first reaction to the Reformation was to introduce religious normative understandings into the law of the land; however, during the Enlightenment, these religious natural law elements were combined with secular law. On the assumption that God's existence was not a necessary precondition for there to be valid law, did not exist 3 the Nordic universities derived their arguments from normative systems based on common European standards, infused by Roman law. 4 Thus, at the beginning of the 19 th century and with the revolutions of the Post-Napoleonic area, most of these countries were already under the rule of a monolithic law of the land, including legislation for the churches.
C. Consequences for Internal Regulation of Established Churches
The 19 th century widened the differences between the East Nordic and the West Nordic countries concerning the idea of a Church as a separate, identifiable entity. In the East, both the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Church of Sweden were provided with a synod during the 1860s. Finland had been annexed by Russia after the Napoleonic wars, and the 1869 synod in the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church was introduced as a dimension of tolerance towards a minority church. After that time, the synod was granted the right to develop internal norms for church governance under the (Russian) law on the church; this internal autonomy was upheld after Finnish independence in 1917. Even though the synod 3 Etsi Deus non daretur, as Hugo Grotius formulated it. 4 Samuel von Pufendorf, who in 1668 was called to Sweden as the first professor of law at University of Lund after its establishment in 1666, was in the European elite of natural law; also Ludvig Holberg, a
Norwegian/Danish Poet (who is more famous for his plays, but who was a professor of Law at the University of Copenhagen) built on this way of thinking in his legal manuscripts in the beginning of the 18 th century in order to change the legal understanding in the West-Nordic countries. Based on this article, the constitution of 1849 thus introduced freedom of religion, along with freedom of association in Danish society. No further legislation, regulation or administrative practice is needed for anyone to organize a religious community and perform rituals.
According to the semi-official Danish commentary on the constitution, freedom of religious 7 Constitutional Act of 1849 which is still in force art 4 and 6. All world religions are present in the Danish society, and especially the last generation has seen a rising plurality of religion with the national church now covering 78% of the population, 15% without any religious denomination and ca 8 % of other religions, Muslim communities covering ca 5% and the Catholic church and other Christian churches and world religions up til 3%.
I will come back to a comparison between the Nordic countries in the end of this article.
8 ibid art 66. The rule is interpreted as a general right for the legislative powers to rule in all matters concerning the majority church.
9 ibid art 67 and 70. English version according to <http://www.euoplysningen.dk/upload/application/pdf/0172b719/Min_Grundlov_eng.pdf%3Fdownload%3D1> accessed 14 January 2015.
association covers the doctrine and the organizational structure necessary for this doctrine, 10 whereas, for example, religious schools are not covered by the freedom-of-religion clause.
The Danish concept of 'religious association' is thus horizontally more limited than the concept of 'religious autonomy' in both European and American legal practice.
Religious associations in Denmark have the same legal status as other associations or organizations without any registration or acknowledgement from state authorities. 11 The
Danish constitution maintains that religious doctrine or organizational structure must not contravene 'decency' or 'public order'. According to leading scholars, this is understood to mean that if religious doctrine or organizational structure contravenes parliamentary law it is prohibited. No further legal test seems to be relevant, including no testing of the necessity or the proportionality of the contravening law. 12 In the same way, legislative powers can, according to this understanding, limit both doctrine and organizational structure if a majority in parliament decides so, which means that doctrinal freedom is also vertically limited.
Normally, the question of conflict between a religious community and society as a whole would focus on actual practice, yet at the same time it is also clear that the (actual) doctrine could function as contextual background, for example, in disbanding a religious community. In such situations, the bishop will carry out a detailed investigation. If the bishop finds grounds for a dismissal based on theological grounds, the governmental ministry of ecclesiastical affairs must refer the case to a special court, composed of the local court, or judge supplemented by theological experts who also function as judges. Other employees of the Folkchurch are employed under the local congregation council within the church. Common labour law is applied, including a general norm regarding observance of the rules of propriety, but with no special requirements regarding their own personal faith.
Space does not allow the examination of all the relevant case law, and I will therefore just
give some examples explaining the legal arguments in these cases in regard to the concept of 'religious autonomy'.
The Snedsted case was a question about a metaphysical fact, 21 which is central to the concept of a 'ministerial exception' from generally applicable law. According to the law on the special courts in these cases, the case was decided by a high court, which included theological members of court. 22 The conflict concerned the format of the baptism ritual: the pastor himself re-formulated the ritual by introducing a 'Baptist' understanding of the christening of the child. As such, the baptism was not intended to be given any effect, until the child as a 23 Congregations within the Folkekirke are normally geographically organized, but it is possible due to theological reasons to change to another pastor and thus another congregation.
on theological grounds. The recommendation was supported by the court, which dismissed the pastor.
The use of both (secular) judges and theological experts to judge such cases was introduced by law in 1992. The new system was an improvement from the old absolutist system where the state administratively made the decision. However, many academic observers saw the above case as the beginning of what became a very heated debate in which one side argued that pastors should not be dismissed on theological grounds at all, whereas the other side argued that a body internally within the church ought to be established to decide such cases.
In other words a discussion ensued about a possible 'religious autonomy' for doctrinal matters within the majority church. The debate led to procedural changes, but not to any changes in the competence of the secular courts.
In the Villekjaer case, 24 a pastor wanted to demonstrate against free abortion in his pastoral gown. In order not to signal any church resistance to the law on free abortion, the local bishop told the pastor not to wear his gown. Nevertheless, the pastor decided to wear his gown at the demonstration. The case was judged by the regular Supreme Court, not the special courts including theological experts, since the case was seen as a regular example of a subordinate not following the discretionary powers of his superior. The case is thus an example of a quite narrow, functional vertical limitation of what could be seen as 'internal affairs' within the Folkchurch.
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A recent case decided by the Board of Equality Affairs is also of interest in this context. Both the Folkchurch and other religious communities have been granted legal exemptions from the general laws on equality and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of gender and sexuality. 25 Hence, they are allowed to discriminate between genders on theological grounds when employing church ministers. In the case, a local congregation council posted an advertisement for the position of second church minister, specifying that they wanted to employ a male pastor. A complaint was filed before the Board of Equality Affairs as a regular case within the competences of the board with the argument that such gender based preferences were not acceptable in a public institution. 26 The board found the advertisement for a male minister to be illegal, since it was not based on any theological grounds. 27 The decision acknowledged that churches and religious communities are entitled to exemptions from the law on equal treatment and prohibition of discrimination. However, the board underlined that this is not a blank exemption, but only relevant if a congregation preferred one The church already had a female pastor as the first pastor and it became clear that the church was simply 'old fashioned' in its approach to women; they did not have any theological foundation for their preference of men.
organizations. 28 In these cases, the narrow conceptualisation is horizontal: a clear occupational requirement is required because not all positions in religious organizations can be exempted from the law; consequently not all employees in ethos-based organizations are automatically exempt.
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C. One Legal System
Even though the Danish constitution offers a wide concept of freedom of religion and belief 32 Cf. the argument above that freedom of religion in Denmark does not cover religious schools and their rights.
When Denmark in 2014 limited the access to religious slaughter under protest from Jewish and Muslim communities, the freedom of religion argument at first stance was the same: this is not about religion; it is about protection of animals. Later the relevant ministry promised that if religious communities would encounter
Another example is the requirement from parliaments, state administrations and the public that cases on possible child abuse should not be seen as protected within the church under canon law, but should be reported to state authorities in order to be prosecuted under the law of the land. None of the Roman Catholic Churches in the Nordic countries has upheld an argument based on Canon Law on these matters; on the contrary, they have formulated internal guidelines on child abuse combining Canon Law instruments with legal and administrative instruments from national law in order to evade any conflict.
III. CHANGES IN RECENT NORDIC LAW
In the Nordic countries, religious norms are thus in general subordinate to secular law, which on the other hand to some extent allows freedom for religious practices contrary to common standards in society. This approach also governs the position and function of a priest. Thus, even in the Nordic context, an employment relation between a member of clergy and his or her church is considered to be more extensive than a general employment relation. This is also the case for medical doctors, schoolteachers or university scholars, who are all expected to show a level of personal engagement beyond their regular labour contracts. The 'special calling' of a priest, therefore, is not more or less special than the calling within other disciplines, at least not in a Lutheran context, which recognizes not only the priesthood of all believers, but also status and calling in all other functions, or, as John Witte Jr. puts it, 'offices problems with regard to the access to meat slaughtered according to religious norms, then the ministry would review the case again in order to support them; that is: a balancing of two different protected norms, one of which being freedom of religion.
of authority in the earthly orders of household, church and state'. 33 It is against this background that one should understand that the function of a priest also contains a worldly dimension which is regulated by secular law. All Nordic countries have labour unions, organizing church pastors and other professional theologians, with the purpose of working for the best conditions for their members vis-à-vis both their employers and the councils of their congregations.
A. A recent Norwegian Case concerning Ministerial Exception for a Catholic Priest
When it comes to clergy in religious communities outside the Evangelical-Lutheran majority churches, the picture is somewhat different. 
B. Changes in Establishment Around 2000 -Independence of Ecclesiastical
Law?
The reason the Nordic countries have not had many cases of conflict between religious norms, understood as religious law, i.e. Canon Law or Islamic Shari'a, and secular law, is partly due to the specific common context of these countries, which all construe freedom of religion in the light of established religious communities.
Recent changes in East Nordic Countries
As Administrative Courts of the Finnish state. 40 Both in Sweden and in Finland, ordinary labour law is applicable, also internally within the two churches.
Recent changes in West Nordic Countries
During WWII and later in the 20 th century, a synod was established within the Norwegian church at the national level. Recently, the appointment of not only common clergy, but also 42 Stålsett-utvalgets report, NOU 7 January 2013 government administration and church administration. 43 The proposal still makes it a condition that a separate Church Act governs the Norwegian church. In the longer term, however, the current Government intends to provide the Church of Norway with legal personality of its own. 44 The proposal also includes the suggestion that the employees of the Church of Norway from now on will be employed by the Church -and not by the State or the municipalities. Finally, the idea is to frame both the Church of Norway and all other religious communities under one common law. These proposals were put out for public consultation in September 2014. It remains to be seen how far the Parliament wants to take this proposal. If the changes are followed through, then the result will be that internal governance guidelines and regulations within the Norwegian church would be seen as having its legal basis in the law on the Church of Norway, a model equal to those in Finland and Sweden. This is also the Icelandic model, established by the national church law in 1997, and still under discussion for leaving too much discretion to national bodies within the church and too little influence for common church members through parliament. 
No Changes in Denmark
In Denmark, a recent attempt to change the organizational structure of the Folkchurch at national level failed because negotiations based on a public report 46 as well as executive powers are seen as providing the people with full access to the Church as well as full equality before the law. 
Impact of Establishment on Other Religious Communities
The degree of establishment also impacts on the Nordic states' approach to other religious communities. In Norway, a driving force behind attempts at disestablishment, at least administratively, is the fact that the Norwegian church and other religious communities are already publicly funded on equal footing; the lack of economic difference aims at diminishing also the legal difference. In Finland, the two different national churches make it possible for the secular state to create a more equal approach and thus allow for more internal governance structures. In Iceland, the internal independence of the administrative bodies of the church is seen as an attempt to place the majority church and minority churches on an equal footing. In Denmark, the (failed) attempt to organize internal bodies at a national level within the religious communities in Denmark. 48 The point of departure is respect for the right of the religious communities to organize and develop their doctrines according to the freedom of religion. However, the idea behind the committee is also to investigate the extent to which the state can regulate religious communities more than it does today. Importantly, the committee must ensure that proposals are formulated within the framework outlined in the constitution, the ECHR and other international obligations.
C. How to Characterize Nordic Ecclesiastical Law?
Whether or not these recent changes in the legal basis for the majority churches in conjunction with a possibly more appreciative understanding of (collective) freedom of religion and belief will lead to a changed understanding in the legal theory and practice of internal normative structures in churches and religious communities in the Nordic countries is, as previously mentioned, a question that is currently theoretically under-analysed. Despite these changes, the traditional view, which rejects canon law as an independent, parallel legal system and only allows for internal ecclesiastical decisions as long as they are not in conflict with the law of the land, could still be upheld. combination of Roman Catholic Canon Law and the concept of 'religious autonomy', as mentioned earlier. This decision seems to recognize a much broader concept than collective freedom of religion as it has traditionally been understood in a Nordic context, which includes the right to decide on internal affairs, but which may be limited according to the law of the land. Religious autonomy, however, is seen as a concept that can only be limited by other fundamental rights, which gives it a much broader scope. I will go into this discussion about the concept of law in use by first considering this dimension of the two relevant ECtHR cases. In regard to the legal certainty of the applicant, and thus the foreseeability of the law, the court refers to 'applicable provisions of canon law' as the legal basis.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF LAW IN USE
A. The Concept of Law in the two recent ECtHR-cases
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The minorities, in both cases, accept the decisions as being based on existing law. In the Spanish case, the argument for this is the existence of a concordat between the Catholic Church (the Holy See), acknowledged as a legal person in international law, and the Spanish state. In the Romanian case, the argument for relying on canon law to satisfy the legality requirement is based on governmental approval.
In countries with concordats, the role of canon law in regard to the Roman Catholic Church is thus understood in line with, for example, European Human Rights law and its role in the member states. decisions. The major dissenting minority in the two cases does not as such dispute the use of canon law as a relevant legislative basis for evaluating the legality of the state decisions.
The Hungarian judge in the Fernández case is, however, quite sharp on this point. The judge is a member of the dissenting minority of eight, but in his own supplementing dissenting opinion he underlines the point that 'the autonomy of religious organizations is not absolute.'
Referring back to previous case law, he further underlines the fact that 'the Court has thus set certain limits on church autonomy. It cannot undermine the legal order that safeguards fundamental rights' (and here the Hungarian judge refers to Refah Partisi). 'Unfortunately', he adds:
that important consideration is omitted from the judgment. … Church autonomy does not mean the public recognition of a sovereign religious legal regime. … In Refah Partisi, it was held that the autonomy of a religious community was a matter to be respected but that it did not entail legal pluralism and did not require domestic courts to become the enforcers of autonomous religious decisions which fell short of their requirements of adequate justification.
'Courts do often consider semi-autonomous and "alien" legal regimes;' but, as the judge points out, there is a difference between semi-autonomous legal regimes and what is here acknowledged as valid law for autonomous religious communities. Also, he adds as a precondition that 'the Convention guarantees still apply and arbitrariness cannot be tolerated in case it results in the restriction of rights.' The basic opinion from the Hungarian judge's perspective is that:
not even internal relations and acts within the religious organisation or community are exempt from State obligations to protect Convention rights. Where the State intervenes to punish incitement to imminent violence advocated by an office holder of a religious organisation and stemming from a religious precept, that intervention will not be barred by considerations of church autonomy.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the judge could persuade neither the majority of nine in the Concordat to follow the decision from the diocese, this was not an absolute obligation.
Therefore the Spanish ministry was obligated to analyse the proportionality and necessity tests. 55 Read in concordance with the Norwegian case, referred to above, it is interesting to see that the Norwegian high court followed exactly this line of argumentation; the court thus did balance the canon law in use with both human rights norms and norms from Norwegian labour law, including the fundamental right to religious autonomy in the argument on the side of canon law.
On the basis of this argument, it becomes possible for the dissenting minority to accept the use of the Canons. 56 In Sindicatul this position becomes even more clear in the concurring opinion of the Polish judge, who argues that 'such legitimate autonomy may be reflected, for example, in self-regulation by means of extra-legal rules of conduct, produced or accepted by different social groups'.
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B. Acknowledgement of Canon Law as Law in Europe
The argument that canon law is not theology but law, merely deriving from sources other than state law, is obvious not only in these cases from the ECtHR. It is a general argument that has become quite common. One way of establishing general validity for canon law is through international agreement between a state and the Holy See. Another way is through the acceptance from a state party. These two routes are followed in the two cases. By following 55 Dissenting opinion by eight judges in Fernández (n 51) argument B, 5-8.
56 ibid argument 15.
57 Sindicatul (n 35) para 2.
these routes, the state's responsibility for the validity of the law is upheld. In the current European context, these lines of argument mean that Roman Catholic Canon Law is valid law in countries with concordats, but not in other countries, and Orthodox Canon Law is canon law if so acknowledged by the particular country through direct acceptance by state authorities.
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The main questions arising from these cases is whether canon law is also valid law in states without a system of concordats and agreements by the state, and whether canon law in such situations, based on the 'religious autonomy'-argument, can function as a legislative basis for limiting the fundamental rights of the employees in the church in question, for example, whether a pastor's rights in accordance with the law of the land could be limited, based on canon law. That is how canon law is used in the Norwegian case, mentioned above.
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It is possible within current law on religion discourses to find different ways of arguing that canon law is valid law also outside countries with a concordat. One approach is to argue that law in modern societies is not only state-based, but originates from many different sources at many different levels. Following this argument, the obligation to include and balance canon law with the law of the land is left to the institution that applies these different sources of law to the facts in concrete cases.
This line of argument was originally related to post-imperialistic studies of law based on a law-and-anthropology approach, which has influenced European approaches to the existence of parallel or partly overlapping legal normative orders to be taken into account. 60 Building on concepts of law related to pluralism in space and time, 61 such approaches seem to fit well with the above mentioned parallel development in European legal theory. More precisely, it fits an understanding of law as inherent to a multi-level order in Europe, based not only on different official institutions with basically a reference to the orders of the state, but also on changed relations between public and private law, including legal normative developments among global private actors. 
C. Shari'a as Law in Europe?
This discussion is relevant, not only in regard to canon law, but equally in regard to Shari'a as law in Europe. In his work, Mathias Rohe establishes links between Shari'a and state law through international private law, but he also underlines the fact that the private international law argument does not fulfil the actual needs in regard to citizens of European countries who wish to follow Islamic legal practice.
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Following the decision in the Refah Partisi case, the academic discourse, to a large extent, accused the ECtHR for dubious blindness towards the legal identity of Muslim groups, for a false construction of Islam and for being militant in its attempt to 'save' democracy from legal pluralism. 64 Others have argued that it is problematic to accept Shari'a as a legal system in Europe due to its lack of compatibility with European legal standards. 67 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 Sup. Ct. 694 (2012) .
but also positivism, includes a dualist approach to international law. It also includes European
Union law based on a conferral of powers.
68
The 'realist' dimension in Scandinavian legal theory is predominately an approach which distances itself from any immaterial legitimacy of the law. Valid law is law applied by courts.
References to natural law arguments, and especially references to theological arguments in law or to religious law, is most often seen as suspicious, due to the lack of parliamentary basis, and thereby without grounding in Scandinavian legal theory. On the other hand, Scandinavian legal theory acknowledges theological historical inputs to legal culture.
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The main and defining challenge in Nordic law on religion is the extent to which openness towards religious dimensions in the law or towards overlapping normative systems includes openness towards law maintained by religious institutions on grounds of their theological or normative framework. 70 The question is whether there is an available pragmatic route between a principled secularism of the law and the courts, and a principled religious legal autonomy.
Another question is whether the Nordic countries are allowed to find such a possible route independently. This question has to do with how the concept of the 'margin of appreciation', which has been developed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, is applied.
V. TURNING THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AROUND
It is thus not clear to what extent the Nordic countries that have changed the legal foundation for establishment and are about to give their majority churches legal subjectivity are also ready to accept the concept of 'religious autonomy', including the superiority of internal ecclesiastical laws -as well as canon law and Shari'a -over the law of the land. What is clear, however, is that some Nordic countries might not be happy following 'religious autonomy' to its logical conclusion, independently of whether they might wish to keep their state churches, and whether or not they wish to impose more control of other religious organizations than in other regions of Europe.
Whether this is possible is the concern of the 'margin of appreciation' argument in the two relevant cases. The Fernández, case, depriving a priest of family life (or of a job, if he wants to pursue family life), and the Sindicatul case, depriving a group of priests of their human right to organize a labour union, are both at odds with common Nordic standards. Here a 'margin of appreciation' argument was used, which implies that these two cases took place in countries where respect for 'religious autonomy' overrules respect for freedom of association or protection of family life and other private affairs. 71 The argument would imply that the Nordic countries do not need to feel obligated by the judgments in the two cases.
The teachers to sign a contract declaring that they will be dismissed if they get an abortion or divorce or live in a same-sex partnership, whilst being employed by the school. By signing the contract before taking up the position at the school, it can be argued that the teacher knows the working conditions before he accepts the job. This would make the dismissal more acceptable, also for the society overall. These contracts have not yet been examined by the Board of Equality.
However, if the case was brought before the Danish courts and then before the ECtHR, there is no reason to expect that, for example, the Roman Catholic Church should accept that they were afforded less 'religious autonomy' in the Nordic countries than elsewhere in Europe. A central dimension in this context is that the rules on prohibition of religious discrimination in the labour market, including the religious labour market, with only very narrow exemptions for religious communities, aim to protect employees from the will of their employers. Such a set of rules is based on the idea of protection of the weaker part. And the weaker parts tend to be those who in general are protected from discrimination: disabled people (as in HosannaTabor); women (as also in Hosanna-Tabor); for gender-and sexuality-related reasons (which indirectly is the case in Fernández); all of whom trying to keep their rights against religious communities which want to uphold their own standards against those of modern European societies. If such groups, as is the case in Sindicatul, are even deprived of the right to react jointly through an association, then that shows everything about why the European Parliament found it necessary to underline that the right to get exemptions on religious grounds is not a right to discriminate on other grounds. 74 Thus, 'religious autonomy' seems an odd concept in this context, unless 'autonomy' is seen as 'semi-autonomy', as mentioned by Judge Sajó in his dissenting opinion, referred to above.
VI. GOVERNANCE VS GOVERNMENT VS LEGISLATIVE AUTONOMY?
As has been shown, it is not unproblematic too easily to adopt concepts such as 'religious autonomy', and especially not when these concepts include the application of canon law as contrary to the law of the land. Then again, it has also been shown that there is a certain development towards such an understanding, also in the Nordic countries.
Before accepting the concept 'religious autonomy' in all its dimensions as it has been applied not only by the ECtHR, but also by the high court in Norway, it might, however, be useful to 74 Cf. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, art 4(2)(1), last sentence, which states that: 'This difference of treatment … should not justify discrimination on another ground'. discuss other approaches to how faith communities could take responsibility for their internal governance structures. They do need to take responsibility for their common formulations of faith as well as for their organizational structure. They also must have a right to argue that such theologically-based doctrines and structures are protected by freedom of religion against not only administrative decisions, but also against the law of the land, unless the legislation can fulfil the necessity and proportionality tests in regard to protection of other rights and interests, as mentioned in ECHR article 9 (2).
The argument that I here formulate is, that this right to self-governance is not necessarily a fundamental right on the same level as other dimensions of human rights. I also argue that such a right does not automatically overturn individual rights protected in ordinary law; ordinary parliamentary law can establish a proportionate and necessary limitation of religious norms and regulations. I further argue that religious communities must accept that it is for the ordinary, secular courts and administrative tribunals to evaluate the necessity-and proportionality tests, including by reviewing the theological grounds for the required exemption. That is what the Norwegian high court did in the Catholic case, referred to above.
Were the courts not to do so, the consequence would be lack of effectiveness of judicial review; which is also what we have seen in many cases.
On the other hand it seems to be time for the Nordic countries to acknowledge the right of religious communities to set up their own internal structure and their own internal regulations without any interference from the state, as long as these rules do not interfere with the rights of others, including their own employees. It could thus be argued that we need to focus on 'semi-autonomous religious governance structures' under possible review of the courts of the country, because the concept of autonomous law in religious communities seems to be too far-fetched.
In this respect, the European Centre for Law and Justice, intervening as a third-party in Fernández, was correct to argue that 'the crucial point for the third party was the possibility of review by the ordinary courts.' 75 I could not agree more, but for the fact that the ECLJ almost certainly regards such a review as deeply problematic, whereas I see such review as the crucial point for safeguarding the rights of the weaker parties in such cases and therefore want such review to be upheld. 
VII. SECULAR AND SACRED
My argument is purely secular, but it is not secularist. Its secularity is of Lutheran origin: the secularity of the law and of the courts in upholding the law, especially, and not least, for the 75 Fernández (n 51) para 98.
weaker parties, is a central dimension of the Lutheran Reformation, which in the West Nordic countries included a dissolution of religious courts, and in all of the Nordic countries included an absolute break with religious law of the Catholic Canon Law applied for and prevailing over national rights for citizens of the lands.
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Lutheranism today however includes different understandings of the law. It is worth mentioning that the Missouri synod, of which the school in Hosanna-Tabor is a member, also understands itself as Lutheran, however based on the Book of Concordia (1580 between the law of the land and ecclesiastical law. Lutheran understanding of the secularity of the law has developed differently in different countries and contexts and is very much related to the situation in the surrounding society.
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Seen from a Nordic perspective, based on a traditional understanding of law as secular, arguments concerning the re-introduction of canon law as well as concepts like 'religious autonomy', with no 'semi' attached to it, are however like observing a counter Reformation, now not only from the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church, but followed up by Anglicans, Calvinists, Orthodox, and all American religions, arguing 'the Wall of Separation', as well as Muslim groups in diaspora looking for a way of introducing Shari'a in Europe.
For a Nordic scholar, this seems to be rather problematic. Be that as it may, the concepts of 'religious autonomy' and canon law are now both part of national human rights law, and we need to find a way to deal with these developments in Nordic law. We also need to find ways to govern the national majority churches in the future and in this context to decide whether or not we also want to introduce 'religious autonomy' and independent 'ecclesiastical law' for the Nordic majority churches. 
